apposite in regard to the USSR. The debate in France was not, however, solely between an intransigent Poincare and a subtle Briand, but also between French politicians and officials who were sharply divided over Russian policy. The secret maneuverings of government took place behind a curtain of trumpeting anti-Red headlines in the right-wing press and on bills stuck to the walls of Paris, and encouraged from the rostrums of the Poincare ministry. Purse, principle, and politics were the stakes in an arena where the pragmatism of business interests wanting to trade in the USSR clashed with anti-Communist ideology, enlisted in the cause of right-wing electoral politics.
II
In early 1921 the Soviet government emerged ruined and virtually bankrupt from a destructive, merciless civil war which had begun after the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917. To rebuild, "the Soviet" -this was the fashionable argot of the British Foreign Office needed trade with the West and credit to finance it. Vladimir I. Lenin, the Red leader, enjoined his colleagues to go to Western Europe, not as Bolsheviks, but as merchants. When they did, they met angry bankers, who held up to the Russians sanctity of contract and demanded settlement of tsarist bonds which the Bolsheviks had repudiated in 1918. Western industrialists claimed damages for their Russian enterprises nationalized during the Revolution. Not a penny of credit, bankers said, until the Soviet government agreed to pay Russia's debts. Although the bankers made no formal agreements among themselves, they maintained a tight credit embargo against the Soviet state.
In response, the Bolsheviks haggled like rug merchants and connived to tempt Western firms into doing business, dangling rich contracts before ardent merchants' eyes. In the postwar recession which struck Europe, it was hard to resist temptation, and Western manufacturers were soon selling needles, shoes, and locomotives to Soviet trade agencies. At first, the Soviet government paid in gold to prime the flow of trade, then it began to ask for credit to keep the flow goingshort-term, spatchcocked credit at first. As Western confidence grew in Soviet reliability to pay its bills, the Bolsheviks demanded longer, cheaper terms. Western lenders bucked at the trend, and most banks still refused to discount Soviet bills of exchange. But the Bolsheviks quickly learned to bargain as hard as any Western merchant. Whereas bankers could afford to rest on their outraged principles of fidelity to contract, manufacturers worried about filling their order books and keeping their "workmen" employed. Bolshevik traders went from country to country looking for the lowest price and the cheapest credit, playing competing firms off against one another. It was an impressively orchestrated, multifaceted campaign of blandishments and coercion.
In the 1920s Soviet trade agencies had a difficult time: prices were high, and shady acceptance houses discounted Soviet bills of exchange on the "black market" at usurious rates. The French and British governments were nevertheless incensed by the quick-studied Bolshevik application of "capitalist" first principles. Great Britain and France became further annoyed when Soviet trade agencies sold oil, timber, and agricultural products in the West, running up large trade imbalances to acquire foreign exchange to buy in other markets. When the AngloFrench complained, Bolshevik traders replied with deadpanned maliciousness that they would buy more when they could obtain cheaper prices and cheaper terms of credit.
In Germany, however, there was quite a different reaction to Soviet traders. The German government did not accept its military defeat in the Great War. The Treaty of Versailles was a rankling, dictated peace, not to be respected any more than circumstances demanded. The German government cheated on reparations payments, and it brooded over the Allied occupation of the Rhineland and over its territorial losses, especially in the east where "the Polish corridor" divided Germany and east Prussia. Under these conditions, the German government took a more pragmatic view of Soviet Russia, though it disliked Communism no less than other Western states. In 1920 Soviet-German trade relations began to develop, and in 1922 Germany concluded the Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia. The German government hated Versailles more than it feared Communism, and it saw Russia as a "necessary evil" to counterbalance France and Great Britain and to undo Versailles.5 On these principles, there was near consensus in Germany; even the banks, though suspicious and grudging in their support, went along. German officials, merchants, and bankers tolerated Bolshevik "rudeness" and collusion with German Communists: it was worth it to reverse the diktat of Versailles. Even Soviet complicity in an abortive Communist rising in 1923 did not disturb German policy. In fact, stern repression of the 1923 putsch gave the German government confidence that it could trade with the Communists in Russia, while safely shooting them at home. Apart from political considerations, the German government sought to encourage Soviet economic development. Indeed it wanted to promote a rapid Russian recovery, though no altruism entered into German political calculations. The Germans believed that the development of the Soviet economy would strengthen the industrial base on which the Red Army could depend for support. The German government did not view Soviet Russia as a potential military adversary, but as a valued ally in any future war with Poland to recover "the corridor."7 Moreover, Russian economic development, many Germans believed, would strengthen the hand of the Soviet government in its relations with the Western powers and make it less vulnerable to their pressure. In terms of Russian domestic politics, the German government believed that Soviet economic development would strengthen the more "moderate" Bolshevik leaders and reduce the influence of the Communist International, the Comintern, a meddler and bungler in world socialist revolution.
Economically, Russia had been important to German prewar trade. The closing of other world markets to German manufactured goods because of the war made continued destitution of the Russian economy a serious impediment to Germany's own economic recovery. German firms believed that their long experience in the Russian market gave them an advantage, which they fully intended to exploit. Russia was a land of dazzling possibilities, thought German business, but so did the German government, in its consuming determination to dismantle the Treaty of Versailles. German manufacturers would gladly have gone it alone in Russia, but the war and reparations made Germany cash poor and, in fact, a net importer of capital. As a result the German government and German firms eagerly sought cooperation in the United States, Great Britain, and France to trade in Russia. In doing so, however, they acted from purest self-interest, because they believed that they would be the main beneficiaries of such cooperation.
That strategy generally governed German policy from 1920, though without much effect until the middle of the decade. offered the German government an opportunity to try out its Russian trade policies. A new German initiative was necessary because of the decision to balance the Locarno accords and entry into the League of Nations with the German-Soviet Treaty of Berlin in April 1926, which included a three-year, 300-million-mark credit to Soviet trade agencies. The provision of credit was intended to support German firms working in Russia, but also to advance the full German political agenda. The size and long term of the credit excited unfavorable comment among the Western powers-hardly an unexpected reaction-and the German foreign ministry quickly reassured its Western critics. Germany would remain true to Locarno, said German officials, and they encouraged Western firms to join their German counterparts in profiting from development of the Russian market. The German government hoped that 300 million marks would create "economic bridgeheads" in Russia, which would in turn serve to attract Western capital, not acting independently but in close cooperation with German firms. The German position in the Russian market would be reinforced and selfinterested foreign criticism deflected.
American, British, and French firms also traded in the USSR, and they all feared competition from Germany and from each other. Naturally, Soviet trade agencies encouraged the competition to obtain lower prices and to break down the Western credit embargo, which in the mid-1920s was formidable. Soviet tactics aroused opposition among the former Allies, but also in Germany, which disliked Soviet "arbitrary" trade practices. If the German government could work together with the Western powers, it believed-somewhat paradoxically in view of German political objectives-they could force the Soviet government to abandon these modi operandi. In August 1926 the German foreign ministry sent orders to that effect to its embassies in the major European capitals and in the United States.8 German firms were eager to find partners wherever they could and were well aware that British and United States businesses were interested in their activities in Russia, if only to prevent Germany from running away with the Russian trade. 300 million marks would not long satisfy the credit-hungry Russians, who proved the old saw that the appetite grows with the eating. In fact, the total German credit available to Soviet trade agencies was closer to 500 million marks, but German officials did not consider this sum to be excessive. "It is only a drop in the ocean," Schlesinger told a British diplomat in 1927.28 What concerned the Auswdrtiges Amt was not the amount of German credit extended to Russia, but the negative reaction of other powers to it. German officials had hoped that on the basis of the German credit guarantee, the Soviet government would find additional credits, especially in Great countries that were "more economically and politically reliable than Russia." If the USSR wants credit, it has only to change its policies in a way that will inspire lenders' confidence. 64 The pullulating maneuvering inside the French government increased when Rakovskii returned to Paris on 17 August. He immediately saw Monzie and Labonne, advising them that the Soviet government was dissatisfied not only with the French credit proposal, but also with the Soviet delegation's concessions on debts. Rakovskii said he had instructions to accept the French position on debts only in exchange for acceptance of the Soviet position of $120 million in credits. "This is our last offer," said Rakovskii. 65 It was a good negotiating position, but Monzie and Labonne held to theirs, saying it was "the only possibility in the present circumstances." It's "the maximum of the maximum." We can promote our proposal only with the greatest difficulty. Poincare "dreams of just one thing, in what manner he can break up the conference, but Monzie relying on the ministry of foreign affairs, in particular Briand, and threatening resignation-calculates on advancing his own scheme." Monzie and Labonne pleaded with Rakovskii not to put his new proposals in writing. They would only offer Poincare the pretext he wanted to rupture the negotiations. 66 Rakovskii did not think the French offer was final, though in fact it was lapsed, Poincare having pulled Monzie's credits off the table. Incredibly, Monzie and Labonne still tried to finesse an agreement. Their persistence to that end was equal only to their audacity-or folly-in thinking they could achieve an agreement in the teeth of Poincare and his officials' determined opposition. It was like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza tilting at windmills.
In fact, Rakovskii's return to Paris aroused fear in the finance ministry that the Soviet would make new concessions. Bizot even accused Monzie of "clandestine demarches" with the Soviet ambassador. We could find ourselves, he complained, faced with a fait accompli. This was precisely Monzie's strategy. Finance strategy was to keep talking to Labonne in order to "moderate Monzie." 67 Finance The position in Berlin was similar. Dirksen wrote to Hoesch on 6 March, saying he too felt that the French and Russians were still far apart on a debts settlement. Without a settlement, French firms would be unable to obtain credits for business in Russia. "It is valuable for us to know," said Dirksen, "that in our economic negotiations with the Russians, we have our back free." It goes without saying that we should maintain "great reserve" in discussing the credit question, not simply because of the "embryonic state of these discussions," but also because of the possible impact on the Russians, "who smell behind all such negotiations the creation of a unified economic front against Soviet Russia." But this was not an overwhelming obstacle. The Russians need credit so badly, Dirksen observed maliciously, "that they will grasp at any financial possibility held out to them, even if it is offered" by a Franco-German company. They will resist price-fixing, but not a Franco-German bank offering credit for Soviet orders: "Behind this facade we can later form a joint company for the provision of manufactures." Wolff was moving in the right direction and might succeed with the support of Briand and Berthelot. Matters were well in hand, thought Dirksen: "we can await further developments." 119 In the middle of March Poincare went to a meeting with Briand and Clementel to talk to Wolff and Deutsch. The premier agreed that private contacts could continue "until the elections," then Clementel would take charge and commerce ministry officials would participate also. 120 But it did not happen. Poincare must have disliked Briand's fishing in forbidden waters, because he had already taken steps to kill off any further talk of credits for the USSR. On 2 March the premier ordered Briand to support an action in the United States by the Banque de France to seize Soviet gold being shipped there as collateral for orders with United States manufacturers. 121 In 1918 But then why did the German government nearly always insist on the French taking the initiative in discussing cooperation in Russia? Primarily it wanted deniability. If information leaked, the Germans could deny that they were responsible for the discussions. It's a French idea, they could say. In so doing, they would also avoid being a target either for French politicians, fearing German economic and political penetration of Russia, or for the British government, which would take umbrage at any hint that Germany sought to form a common front against Great Britain in Russia.
The French did not want the responsibility any more than the Germans. 'After you, Alphonse" was thus the Gallic response, since the French were just as wary of offending the British government. And neither the French nor the Germans wanted to excite Soviet fears of capitalist encirclement. Such excitement could have adverse political and economic consequences. The publicity around Monzie's discussions in Germany showed how easily the Soviet government became suspicious, though in this case it misinterpreted his motives. Ironically, Poincare and his officials were just as suspicious of Monzie -for the opposite reasons.
Nevertheless, German officials Schlesinger and Dirksen, who were most involved with the question, believed that Franco-German cooperation could be made tolerable to the Russians. The need for credit was too great to permit the Soviet government to turn down the right package. The real question was whether the package could be made acceptable to Poincare. The German idea was blocked in Paris before it ever reached Moscow. Poincare had no interest in the German proposition; it could lead to electoral defeat in 1928. And why should France finance a German-led enterprise?
In Berlin the question thus returned to where it had begun: SovietGerman relations still pivoted on the German determination to escape from the consequences of defeat in the Great War. German officials were unwilling to throw over the USSR for France or any other Western power. Russia 
